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BOOK REVIEWS
DESEGREGATION AND THE LAw: The Meaning and Effect of the
School Segregation Cases. By Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence
Clyde Ferguson, Jr., New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press. 1957. Pp. XIV, 333. $5.00.
Throughout the United States each fall the main topic of con-
versation shifts from the weather to school segregation. The ringing
of the school bells marks an increase in the efforts of Negroes to
enter formerly all-white schools and in the activities by others to
thwart their admission. Heretofore quiet cities and towns have
experienced turbulence which has made their names known through-
out the world. Little Rock, Clinton, and Sturgis are no longer just
communities in the upper South, but are names which long will
be associated with the struggle to desegregate their schools. Per-
sons such as Bryant Bowles, John Kasper, and Orval Faubus have
achieved nationwide notoriety almost overnight because of their pro-
segregation activities.
In spite of public interest in desegregation, few people have an
adequate knowledge of the question. Its political, moral, and social
aspects have been more fully reported to the public and better com-
prehended by it than the legal ones. Most laymen, and perhaps
most lawyers also, have no real understanding of the legal issues
involved. They have not read the School Segregation Cases;' they
have no clear concept as to the meaning of the relevant constitu-
tional provisions. All too often explanations of the law have been
so intermixed with other arguments that they have all but disap-
peared from the popular consciousness. Yet the legal side of the
problem provides the framework for all progress toward integration
and for all lawful resistance to desegregation. The time has arrived
for a full-dress legal study of the meaning and effect of the School
Segregation Cases.
Desegregation and the Law is a book written for laymen as
well as for lawyers. In nontechnical terms it provides an explanation
of the law controlling desegregation. While it presents a pro-inte-
gration point of view, it is not just another political or philosophical
text. It shows how the issue of discrimination came through a
lengthy course of litigation and how finally it reached the Supreme
IBrown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Boling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 847 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Court. It defends the legal decision of the high court by tracing its
legal history and background. And it illuminates some of the legal
results stemming from the doctrines of the Court, both as to the
efforts to circumvent them by legislation and as to their use as prece-
dent for determining other cases.
In 1954 twenty-two states and the District of Columbia had
laws either requiring or permitting segregation by race of students
in schools. 2 On May seventeenth of that year the Supreme Court
determined that such laws were inconsistent with the Constitution
of the United States. The violated constitutional provisions were the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Because laws necessarily
affect different people in different ways, it is quite clear that not all
legislative classifications are precluded by the equal protection
clause; for if they were, all laws would be unconstitutional. The
test for constitutionality of a classification is that of reasonableness.
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education determined that cate-
gorization of students by race was so unreasonable as to deny equal
protection.
The case from the District of Columbia, Boiling v. Sharpe,4 in-
volved interpretation of the fifth amendment due process clause,
since by the fourteenth amendment only the states are prohibited
from denial of equal protection. Chief Justice Warren in his opinion
maintained that:
"Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to
any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on
Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that con-
stitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of
the Due Process Clause." 5
The legal objections raised as to the constitutional positions
adopted by the Court-objections relating to the change from prior
law and objections as to the content and source of the new law-are
considered and answered by Professors Blaustein and Ferguson.
Their answers form the bulk of their book.
2 For a list of such statutes, see Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Pub-
lic Schools-1953, 67 HAzv. L. REv. 377, 378 (1954). The applicable West
Virginia provisions are W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 8; W. VA. CODE c. 18, art. 5,
§§ 14, 16 (Michie 1955).
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4347 U.S. 497 (1954).
5 Id. at 500.
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Perhaps the favorite legal argument from southern forces
against the School Segregation Cases is the contention that the
decisions made therein were contrary to the prior expressed posi-
tion of the Court. By giving earlier cases narrow interpretations-
while southerners insist on expansive ones-the authors conclude
that not until Brown v. Board of Education did the Supreme Court
face and answer "the ultimate question: Is racial segregation in
public schools unconstitutional per se?" (p. 112) They note that
nowhere in Plessy v. Ferguson,6 the case purportedly establishing
the pre-1954 constitutional standard of "separate but equal," did
the Court say that the constitution permits segregation where equal
facilities are provided. The judges merely upheld the Louisiana
transportation segregation laws as "reasonable." They left unan-
swered the "two critical questions: What are the criteria for meas-
uring equality? What is the proper judicial remedy where ine-
quality is found to exist?" (pp. 98-99)
The three pre-New Deal Supreme Court school segregation
cases are similarly treated. In connection with Cummings v. Board
of Education,7 the first case in which petitioners asserted before the
high court that state-supported separate schools were unconstitu-
tional, it is noted that the conclusion adverse to the claimants rested
on a matter of technical legal procedure, the contention came too
late, instead of on the validity of "separate but equal." (p. 100)
Berea College v. Kentucky8 and Gong Lum v. Rice,9 the other two
early "separate but equal" cases are similarly disposed of as not
directly validating the continuance of separate school systems. (pp.
100-02) The authors do, however, admit that Supreme Court failure
to face the issue squarely did, for all practical purposes, permit the
"separate but equal" concept to achieve "de facto constitutionality in
the field of public education as a minimum constitutional require-
ment." (p. 103)
After reviewing Plessy and the three early education cases,
Professors Blaustein and Ferguson turn to four cases dealing with
law school and graduate education.' 0 In these cases, while the
6163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
8211 U.S. 45 (1908).
9 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
10These cases are: Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v.
Board of Regents, 839 U.S. 147 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Education, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 837 (1938).
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Court did not purport to disturb the "separate but equal" doctrine,
it did order the admission of Negroes to formerly all-white state-
supported institutions on the ground that in the particular instances
involved separate education could not by its very nature be equal.
In none of these cases did the Court have to reach the point of
declaring racial classification unconstitutional per se. Since their
net result was to require integration of Negro students, they tended
to undermine, rather than further, the constitutional basis of school
segregation.
Assuming, as the lawyers from the South do, that "separate but
equal" was the law, we are then faced with the contention that in
the School Segregation Cases the justices ignored a fundamental
maxim of the common law-the principle of stare decisis. Did they
do so? It depends upon what is meant by the doctrine of precedent.
If it is viewed as a rigid doctrine by which courts are inexorably
governed by prior cases in point, then it was badly bent, if not
broken, in Brown v. Board of Education. But stare decisis is not so
viewed by the authors. According to the general view it makes
room for reconsideration of past determinations in the light of
present conditions; it gives way before "the dynamic component of
history."" Cardozo stated that:
"If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day,
or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they
ought not to tie in helpless submission the hands of their
successors."
12
This is especially true of constitutional law where the legislature
cannot mitigate the rigors of strict adherence to precedent.'8
The second major branch of the attack on the Supreme Court's
desegregation views relates to the questions raised concerning the
source and content of the new law. It is contended that nowhere
in the Constitution is the federal government given any power over
education. That is true. But neither is there any constitutional
mention of laundries. Yet in Yick We v. Hopkins,14 when San
Francisco authorities exercised their discretion in such a way as to
grant laundry permits to all whites and deny them to all Chinese,
the Supreme Court struck down the practice as a denial of equal
11 DoucLAs, STARE DEcisis 9 (1949).
12 Ciozo, THE NAruRE OF TnE JumcAL PnocEss 152 (1921).
1
3 Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative Deci-
sions, 59 W. VA. L. 11Ev. 111, 120 n.63 (1957).
14 118 U.S. 856 (1886).
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protection. The equal protection clause is addressed to matters
belonging to the states, "and it declares an all-pervading principle
from which no state may find refuge.... Under it the only prob-
lem is whether racially segregated schools can truly be equal."15"
This problem is very much the business of the federal govern-
ment-not only that of Congress, but also that of the courts.
It has been said, though, that the mid-1950's desegregation
opinions violate the intent of the draftsmen of the fourteenth amend-
ment not to strike down then prevailing school segregation prac-
tices.16 The Court, however, found no conclusive history as to
intent17 and proceeded to interpret the amendment without legis-
lative intent as the basis of their action. The function of the judi-
ciary in constitutional interpretation is examined in Desegregation
and the Law. In accord with most informed opinion as to the
nature of constitutional interpretation, the authors conclude with
Justice Holmes that:
"The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical for-
mulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living
institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance
is vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking
the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and
the line of their growth."Is
The case deciding function of judges of necessity requires them to
"make" law, whether we like it or not.
It has also been asserted that the segregation decisions rested
on "sociology" rather than on law. This argument overlooks the fact
that the law school cases, especially Sweatt v. Painter,19 provide
powerful precedent for the view adopted. If racial segregation in
legal education is violative of the constitutional mandate, is not all
such segregation open to question? The appeal of the Chief Justice
to psychological and sociological knowledge as well as to the cases
has raised a good deal of controversy. Yet when a case will have
a bearing on such matters and when they relate to the case it is
purest folly for judges to close their eyes to all but purely legal
sources. In fact it is submitted that they cannot do so. Like
15 Fairman, The Attack on the Segregation Cases, 70 HAiv. L. RiEv. 88,
86, (1956).
16 For a recent statement of that sort, see Harv. L. Record, Dec. 12, 1957,
p. 1, col. 1 (quoting Senator J. Strom Thunond (D) of South Carolina).
17 347 U.S. at 489.
18 Gompers v. United States, 238 U.S. 604, 610 (1913).
19339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Southern lawyers whose legal arguments are grounded in their
belief in the so-called Southern way of life, judges too are influenced
by nonlegal factors. The opinion in Brown v. Board of Education
would have been freer from attack if Chief Justice Warren had not
included footnote 11 and excerpts from the findings of the Kansas
and Delaware courts. He could have merely noted that separation
cannot be consistent with equality. It is asserted by the authors,
however, that "where current economic or psychological thoughts
influence judicial decision, as they must, such influence should be
exposed and identified." (p. 137)
The legal results flowing from the initial determination by the
Court that separation by race of public school students violates the
Constitution did not immediately present themselves because of
the Court's use of an unusual device. It divided the problem into
two parts: the decision and the decree. Although in May of 1954
the judges said segregation was invalid, they delayed a year before
issuing a decree as to what should be done about the admittedly
unconstitutional practice.20 This seldom employed technique was
coupled with another almost unique device. The district courts
were given the power "to take such proceedings and enter such
orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary
and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscrimina-
tory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases."
2 1
This gave the lower courts discretion in carrying out the Supreme
Court mandate. They were given leeway to act "with all deliberate
speed."
Just how fast is speed that is deliberate? Professors Blaustein
and Ferguson look to the case of Virginia v. West Virginia22 for the
first Supreme Court use of this phrase. West Virginia owed money
to its mother state, money which Virginia wanted immediately. The
Court said it was enough if West Virginia "proceeds .. .with all
deliberate speed."2 3 It was recognized that a state cannot move as
rapidly as an individual. Similarly, in the segregation cases it would
have been unreasonable to expect immediate action by state offi-
cials. The justices gave the local school authorities and other state
officials a chance to work out at a local level the tangled web of
20 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
21 Id. at 301.
22222 U.S. 17 (1911).
23 Id. at 19.
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problems that were sure to arise in connection with changing from
operation of schools on a racial basis to their operation on a non-
racial one.
It has been suggested that perhaps an order for immediate in-
tegration at the time of the first decision would in the long run have
been more practical.24 At any rate hindsight now makes it obvious
that the respite given by the Court to the South has been used in
many areas to foster plans to circumvent the decision and to stiffen
the will for resistance to the Court's order. Not only has the lawless
element used the delay, but also responsible government officials
in the still-segregated states have seen fit to erect a series of legal
barriers to the enforcement of the Court's will.2 5
Superficial compliance with the command to desegregate is
proving to be an effective means of promoting continued racial
segregation. One such device is the assignment of pupils to schools
purportedly on other bases than that of race, but as a matter of fact
on a racial pattern. Assignment statutes usually provide a long chain
of administrative officials to consider and reconsider the claims of
disappointed assignees. Already the federal courts have permitted
litigants to invoke their aid without going through the administra-
tive process first. In the Adkins case2 6 it was made clear that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will not require
litigants to exhaust a process which basically gives them no remedy.
The stage is now set for an attack on the actual assignments them-
selves.
By their power over the purse state legislators have erected
some laws designed to impede the course of integration. They have
provided -that any school which integrates will lose all state financial
aid, and, since the Little Rock crisis, that all state assistance will be
cut off from any school at which federal troops are enforcing de-
segregation orders.27 Other laws go even further and take the state
out of the education business altogether if integration is com-
manded. These statutes have not as yet been considered by the
Supreme Court. When they are it is certain that that body will
24 M nRrN, THE DEEP SourH SAYs Nxvxi 171-72 (1957).
25 For a check list of desegregation circumventing statutes, see N.Y. Times,
Sept. 29, 1957, § 4, p. 5, col. 4.
26Adkins v. School Board, 148 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d
325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 83 (1957).2 7 Texas recently has passed such legislation. Morgantown Post, Dec. 12,
1957, p. 12, col 5.
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consider the possible relevance of the cases which upset the efforts
of the South to keep Negroes from voting in primaries by abolishing
all primary election machinery.28 The current efforts will probably
meet the same fate. At least that is the judgment of the authors.
Discouragement of potential litigants is discussed by Professors
Blaustein and Ferguson in the context of the Southern attack on the
NAACP, the organization which in one way or another has been
behind almost every desegregation case. (pp. 247-52) They also
talk about state actions designed to breathe new life into the long
dead and buried pre-Civil War doctrines of nullification and inter-
position. (pp. 242-47) Such state's rights pronouncements will have
little impact on federal judges.
In spite of the attack on the validity of the decisions made in
the School Segregation Cases, they have entered the books as prece-
dent. And irrespective of the efforts to slow "all deliberate speed"
to a dead standstill segregation is on its way out. Brown v. Board of
Education is the law. It is being used by the Court as precedent
not only in the area of public education but also in other areas where
legally required segregation by races exists. (c. 12) Although its
influence will be writ larger in the future, an understanding of its
present impact is important. That understanding is provided in
Desegregation and the Law.
Ray Jay Davis.
Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
28See Terry v. Adams, 845 U.S. 461 (1952); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944).
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